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INFO MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME COLLECTIVE

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TAGS: [MTCRE](#) [ETTC](#) [KSCA](#) [MNUC](#) [PARM](#) [TSPA](#) [FR](#) [UK](#) [AS](#)
SUBJECT: MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME (MTCR): SYRIA'S
BALLISTIC MISSILE PROGRAM AND FOREIGN SUPPLIERS

Classified By: ISN/MTR DIRECTOR PAM DURHAM FOR REASONS 1.4 (B), (D)
AND (H).

¶1. (U) This is an action request. Please see
paragraph 2.

¶2. (C) ACTION REQUEST: Department requests Embassy
Paris provide the interagency cleared paper "Syria's
Ballistic Missile Program and Foreign Suppliers" in
paragraph 3 below to the French Missile Technology
Control Regime (MTCR) Point of Contact (POC) for
distribution to all Partners. Department also requests
Embassy London provide paper to the MTCR Information
Exchange (IE) Co-Chair (John Andrews), and Embassy
Canberra provide paper to the Australian MTCR Plenary
Chair for 2008/2009 and/or appropriate staff. Info
addressees also may provide to host government
officials as appropriate. In delivering paper, posts
should indicate that the U.S. is sharing this paper as
part of our preparation for the Information Exchange
that will be held in conjunction with the MTCR Plenary
in Canberra (November 3-7). NOTE: Additional IE
papers will be provided via septels. END NOTE.

¶3. BEGIN TEXT OF PAPER:

SECRET//REL MTCR

SYRIA'S BALLISTIC MISSILE PROGRAM AND FOREIGN SUPPLIERS

Introduction

Despite having produced Scud missiles for over 10 years, Syria continues to rely on foreign sources for critical components and technical expertise to support its ballistic missile development efforts. North Korea remains Syria's key Scud ballistic missile technology supplier, although Syria's missile program has also tried to procure missile-related technology from suppliers outside North Korea, including MTCR Partners.

Foreign Support

Syria's lack of a self-sufficient ballistic missile infrastructure has resulted in Syria turning to foreign suppliers for items critical to its liquid and solid-propellant ballistic missile programs. For example, Syria has attempted-at times directly through its missile-related entities-to procure hardware significant for the maintenance and production of Scud airframes, as well as various electronic components used in Scud SRBM guidance and control systems.

Syria also has relied on North Korean entities to serve

as procurement agents for its missile program. Between 2005 and 2006, North Korean entities sought, on Syria's behalf, raw materials, including graphite necessary to construct the jet-vanes for Scud SRBMs and nozzle throats for long-range battlefield rockets. In one such case, Syria solicited North Korean assistance to procure graphite from third countries, including China. In 2005, a North Korean entity sought missile-related alloys, such as titanium-stabilized duplex stainless steel (Ti-DSS), for a Syrian ballistic missile entity. Ti-DSS is an MTCR-controlled steel developed exclusively for Scud missile production, and it remains ideally suited for Scud-type short-range ballistic missiles due to its strength and corrosion-resistance. In yet another instance, a North Korean company shipped several tons of Chinese origin missile-related specialty steel to Syria's Scientific Studies and Research Center (SSRC). North Korean procurement of raw materials for Damascus continued in 2007 and 2008, and during the January-April 2008 timeframe, a North Korean entity worked to procure probable missile-related steel and other materials from a China-based entity for Syria. This trend is likely to continue, as Syria will need to continue to acquire raw materials, specialty metals, alloys, and chemicals for its missile program.

Damascus also depends upon Pyongyang for the acquisition of machine tools and testing equipment for its ballistic missile program. North Korea on several occasions has brokered sales of MTCR-controlled machine tools for Syria from entities in Europe and Asia. Syria has independently sought similar equipment from Western firms using front companies affiliated with Syria's SSRC. Syria's acquisition of these types of advanced machine tools could allow it to expand and improve its ballistic missile production capabilities.

Iran also has been assisting Syria in the ballistic missile field since the early 1990s, when Iran contracted with SSRC for the joint construction of both solid- and liquid-propellant production facilities. The infrastructure for a solid-propellant production facility at Al Safirah has already been completed. This facility may be used for production of the unguided Iranian Zelzal rocket in Syria, and also might be involved in developing solid-propellant motors for an unidentified short-range ballistic missile that Syria was preparing to test in December 2007.

Outlook

Syria is likely to continue seeking material and technological support for its ballistic missile program from foreign suppliers. Damascus will continue to rely on Pyongyang for assistance because of the North's extensive procurement networks and historical association with Syria's ballistic missile program. However, Syria's efforts to acquire solid-propellant missile systems may continue to open the door for new potential foreign partners such as Iran that have experience with solid-propellant technologies.

END TEXT OF PAPER.

¶4. (U) Please slug any reporting on this or other MTCR issues for ISN/MTR. A word version of this document will be posted at www.state.sgov.gov/demarche.

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